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I. INTRODUCTION
Breaking news: "Developers, bureaucrats and environmentalists
still are seeking answers on what is a wetland subject to regulation
after the U.S. Supreme Court punted on the matter Monday in a case
that involved Midlander John Rapanos."'
In 1989, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality2
cited developer John Rapanos for filling thirty acres of wetlands
without a § 404 Clean Water Act permit. 3 The wetlands, which
Rapanos cleared to develop a shopping mall, were on a 175 acre
piece of property twenty miles from Lake St. Clair.4 Four years
later, the United States indicted Rapanos on two federal criminal
charges for continuing to fill the wetlands in spite of an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cease-and-desist work
order. 5 Rapanos was fined $185,000 and sentenced to three years
of probation and 200 hours of community service.6 Fourteen years
later, in 2003, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit upheld Rapanos' conviction on two counts of polluting
wetlands without a permit.7 In 2004, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari to hear Rapanos' criminal case.
8
Copyright 2008, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Ralph E. Wirtz, Supreme Court Decision in Rapanos Wetlands Case 'A
Mixed Bag', MIDLAND DAILY NEWS, June 20, 2006, at 1A, available at
http://www.ourmidland.com/site/index.cfm?newsid=16812165&BRD=2289&P
AG=461 &deptid=578054&rfi=8.
2. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality was known at the
time as the Michigan Department of Natural Resources. Under the Clean Water
Act, a state can assume the enforcement and administration of a § 404 program.
3. United States v. Rapanos, 115 F.3d 367, 369 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 917 (1997).
4. Id. at 368.
5. Id. at 369.
6. Id. After sentencing, Rapanos requested a new trial. The government
appealed for a stricter sentence. The District Court granted a new trial and set
aside the jury verdict. The Sixth Circuit reversed the decision to grant a new
trial and reinstated the jury verdict. Id. at 374.
7. This case has a very complicated procedural history. Rapanos appealed
his conviction after the Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of a new trial and
reinstated the jury verdict against him. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed his
conviction and remanded the case for resentencing. See United States v.
Rapanos, 235 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 2000), vacated, 533 U.S. 913 (2001). Rapanos
appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded back
to the Sixth Circuit to reconsider the case in light of Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S.
159 (2001). See Rapanos v. United States, 533 U.S. 913 (2001). The Sixth
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In 1994, the United States also began a civil case against
Rapanos. 9 The district court, in 2000, found that Rapanos had
filled a total of fifty-four acres of protected wetlands over which
the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) had jurisdiction.' ° On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed." After seventeen years of
protracted civil and criminal litigation and a denial of certiorari in
the criminal trial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
Rapanos' civil case.' 2  The Court consolidated Rapanos with
another Sixth Circuit case, Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, another case in which the appellate court had granted
the Corps jurisdiction over a particular wetland area. 13
The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the Sixth
Circuit.'4 All of the Justices agreed that the Corps possibly had
jurisdiction over Rapanos' and Carabell's wetlands. If so, it was a
violation of the Clean Water Act for Rapanos to fill the wetlands
without getting a permit and a proper exercise of jurisdiction for
the Corps to deny a fill permit to the Carabells. Five Justices voted
to remand the case back to the Sixth Circuit to determine if the
Rapanos and Carabell wetlands fell within the statutory
framework. 15
Circuit remanded to the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in
light of SWANCC. See United States v. Rapanos, 16 F. App'x 345 (6th Cir.
2001). The District Court dismissed the case against Rapanos, finding that the
wetlands at issue were not directly adjacent to navigable waters, thus not subject
to Corps regulation. See United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (E.D.
Mich. 2002). The United States appealed, and in 2003 the Sixth Circuit
reinstated Rapanos' criminal conviction. See United States v. Rapanos, 339
F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 972, reh'g denied, 541 U.S.
1070 (2004).
8. Rapanos v. United States, 541 U.S. 972 (2004).
9. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S.
Ct. 2208 (2006). The civil case involved a smaller portion of the same wetlands
involved in the criminal case.
10. Id. at 634. The wetlands in question comprised three individual sites:
the Salzburg site, the Hines Road site, and the Pine River site.
11. Id. at648.
12. Rapanos v. United States, 546 U.S. 932 (2005).
13. Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir.
2004), vacated sub nor, Rapanos, 546 U.S. 932.
14. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
15. Id.
2008] NOTES 985
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
The Justices divided three ways, however, on what was
necessary in order to find jurisdiction.' 6  In Rapanos, four
members of the Court found that the Corps has jurisdiction over a
non-navigable wetland, and thus a fill permit is required only if the
wetland is both adjacent to and has a surface hydrological
connection with a traditionally permanent navigable body of
water. 17 Four others found that the Corps has jurisdiction over a
non-navigable wetland that is adjacent to a navigable body of
water or a tributary of such a water body.' 8 Justice Kennedy found
that the Corps has jurisdiction over any wetland with a significant
hydrological connection (nexus) to a navigable body of water or a
navigable tributary.19
Part II of this note discusses the background leading up to the
Supreme Court's 2006 Rapanos decision. Understanding the
scope of the decision requires an examination of the Clean Water
Act's fill permit requirements and two previous cases interpreting
those requirements. Part III discusses the decision in detail,
including the differing views of the plurality, the dissent, and
Justice Kennedy. Part IV analyzes the impact of the Court's
murky decision, including the disorganized state of the law
following the decision and its impact on other Clean Water Act
provisions. The Note concludes with a discussion of the likely
result on remand, the options available to remedy the problem by
regulatory change, and the possible adoption of a recent Senate bill
to amend the Clean Water Act in light of Rapanos.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Clean Water Act2 °
The crucial issue in Rapanos was the scope of the Corps'
jurisdiction over wetlands under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (Clean Water Act, or CWA). Passed in 1972, the
objective of the CWA is "to restore and maintain the chemical,
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2227.
18. Id. at 2258 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 2241 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-74 (2006).
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physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.' 2  In
order to accomplish this goal, a primary focus of the CWA is to
eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters.2 2 By
the 1960s, previous regulation had left the nation's waters
alarmingly deteriorated. 23  A two-year water quality study
indicated that previous national efforts to decrease water pollution
"ha[d] been inadequate in every vital aspect. ' 24  As a result,
Congress enacted comprehensive legislation.
25
The CWA regulates pollution of navigable waters. Congress
defined "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas." 26 The Committees for Public Works
for both the House and the Senate indicated a reluctance to define
the term "navigable waters" with any more specificity. 27 Congress
intended that the definition adopted, "the waters of the United
States," be viewed "in the geographic sense, not in the technical
sense. ' 28 Thus, pollution control over navigable waters "clearly
encompasses all water bodies, including main streams and their
tributaries. 29
Congress enacted two separate permit programs to control the
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters. The National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (CWA § 402) allows
discharges of any pollutants or combinations of pollutants into
navigable waters if the EPA or a state agency administering its
own § 402 program grants the polluter a permit.30  The second
21. Id. § 1251.
22. Id.
23. S. REP. No. 92-414, at 7 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3674.
24. Id.
25. 118 CONG. REC. 33,716 (1972) (statement of Senator Eagleton, finding
that the best word to describe the legislation is "comprehensive" in its coverage
of water pollution sources and engagement of different government levels,
making it the most "significant advance" in the twenty-year history of federal
water pollution control).
26. Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006).
27. H.R. REP. No. 92-911, at 76-77 (1972); S. REP. No. 92-414, at 77
(1971).
28. 188 CONG. REc. 33,756 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (statement of
Representative Dingell).
29. Id. at 33,757.
30. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). "Pollutant[s]" include
sewage, garbage, incinerator waste, biological materials, and solid wastes,
among others. Id. § 502(6). "Discharge of a pollutant" includes any addition of
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permit program (CWA § 404) regulates the deposit of dredged or
fill material. 3' Under the CWA, the definition of "pollutants" also
includes dredged soil, rock, and sand.32 Permits for the deposit of
dredged or fill material are granted either by the Corps or a state
with a § 404 program approved by the EPA.
The Army Corps of Engineers administers the § 404 permit
program of dredged or fill material and retains veto power over a
permit if a state operates its own permit program. A state permit
program covers only waters that are not navigable in
fact-principally wetlands. In 1974, the Corps promulgated
regulations that interpreted the § 404 program to require permits
for deposits of fill material into only waterways that met the
traditional test of navigability.34 Two district courts struck down
the narrow interpretation of "navigable waters" as an overly-
restrictive interpretation of congressional intent.35 Over the next
decade, the Corps revised its regulations concerning the scope of
jurisdiction over navigable waters, and in particular, wetlands.36
The regulations specified "coastal wetlands and freshwater
wetlands" as navigable waters, provided that "they were
contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters."3 7 In 1977, the
Corps defined wetlands adjacent to other waters of the U.S. as
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. Id. § 502(12). A
"point source" is any "discernable and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to any pipe, ditch, or channel," among others. Id. § 502(14). With a few
other exceptions not relevant here, any other discharges of any pollutant into
navigable waters is prohibited. Id. § 301(a).
31. Id. § 404.
32. Id. § 502(6).
33. Id. § 404(a), (g)(1). Michigan, the state involved in Rapanos,
administers its own § 404 permit program.
34. 39 Fed. Reg. 12,119 (Apr. 3, 1974). See also Stephen M. Johnson,
Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands, 23 ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (1993).
35. See United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974)
(finding that Congress intended to exercise full federal authority to regulate
water pollution, and this authority does not rest on past interpretations of
navigability in fact); Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685
(D.C. 1975) (finding that "the waters of the United States" extends federal
jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the extent permissible under the
Constitution, and is not limited to traditional notions of navigability).
36. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 11-12 (noting specific regulation
changes in 1977 (42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (July 19, 1977)) and 1986 (51 Fed. Reg.
41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986))).
37. Id.
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"waters of the United States" subject to the CWA.38 At the time of
the Rapanos decision, the Corps' jurisdiction included interstate
wetlands, wetlands adjacent to other U.S. waters, and isolated
wetlands if the use, degradation, or destruction of the isolated
wetlands could affect interstate commerce.39
B. Previous Judicial Interpretations of "the Waters of the United
States"
Rapanos was not the Supreme Court's first attempt to delineate
which wetlands could be part of "the waters of the United States."
In two prior cases, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), the Court reviewed the
applicability of the Corps' regulations in very different contexts.
1. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 4
In Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court upheld the Corps'
assertion of CWA jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to other
waters covered by the CWA. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
began to fill eighty acres of low-lying marshy land as part of
preparations for a housing development near Lake St. Clair in
Michigan. 41 The Corps sought to enjoin the company from filling
the property without a § 404 permit.42  At the time, Corps
regulations defined "the waters of the United States" to include
wetlands---"those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface
or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support,
and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.
'A3
The Corps construed the CWA to cover wetlands adjacent to other
covered waters, such as Lake St. Clair.
44
38. Id.
39. Id. (noting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1993)).
40. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
41. Id. at 124.
42. Id.
43. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1978). See also Riverside Bayview Homes, 474
U.S. at 124.
44. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1978). See also Riverside Bayview Homes, 474
U.S. at 124.
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The Court defined the question in Riverside Bayview Homes as
one of regulatory and statutory interpretation. 45 If the property was
an "adjacent wetland" within the meaning of the regulation and the
Corps had the authority to regulate deposits into the particular
46
wetland, then the exercise of jurisdiction was proper. The Court
premised its decision on two findings of the lower court. First, the
district court found that the property was "characterized by the
presence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for
growth and reproduction. ' 47 Second, it ruled that the wetland was
adjacent to a body of navigable water, since the wetland boundary
extended to Black Creek, a navigable waterway.48 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the wetland area in question was part of the
"waters of the United States" if the regulation was a valid exercise
of Corps jurisdiction over "navigable waters. ' 49
Noting that it was an exercise in linguistics to classify any
types of "land" as "waters"--the Court determined that the Corps
had to make a judgment about areas that "are not wholly aquatic,
but nevertheless fall far short of being dry land.",50 Based on the
comprehensive nature of the Clean Water Act and the idea that
"[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and . . . the discharge of
pollutants [should] be controlled at the source,"51 the Court
concluded that Congress intended to regulate at least some waters
"that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical
understanding of the term." Therefore, the Corps could reasonably
conclude that "waters" encompassed wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters more conventionally defined.52
The Court then noted that the Corps' reasonable interpretation
would be true even for wetlands that were not the result of flooded
adjacent waters because wetlands could affect the water quality of
adjacent lakes, rivers, and streams even without such lakes, rivers,
45. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 126.
46. Id. Note that the Court was only deciding whether Riverside Bayview
Homes had to apply for a permit under § 404 to fill the wetland, not whether the
company could actually do the work. See id,
47. Id, at 130-31.
48. Id. at 131.
49. Id,
50. Id, at 132.
51. Id. at 132-33 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-414 at 77 (1971), as reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742).
52. Id. at 133.
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or streams inundating the wetlands. 53 Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc. needed a § 404 permit because the Corps regulation expanding
"waters of the United States" to include wetlands adjacent to other
bodies of water over which it had jurisdiction was a reasonable
interpretation of the Clean Water Act.
54
2. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) 55
In 2001, the Court again reviewed the Corps' definition of
"waters of the United States" in SWANCC. In SWANCC, the Court
declined to extend the holding of Riverside Bayview Homes to
isolated ponds used as breeding sites for migratory birds. Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, a consortium of twenty-
three Chicago area cities and villages, contacted the Corps to
determine if it needed a permit to develop a disposal site for baled,
nonhazardous solid waste on the site of an abandoned sand and
gravel mining pit.56 The abandoned site had several excavation
trenches that had evolved into "permanent and seasonal ponds of
varying size (from under one-tenth of an acre to several acres) and
depth (from several inches to several feet). 57
The Corps originally concluded that it had no jurisdiction over
the site because it was not a wetland or other area that supported
vegetation that needed saturated soil.58  However, after a call
concerning the presence of migratory birds at the site, the Corps
asserted jurisdiction pursuant to a regulation authorizing
jurisdiction over intrastate waters used as a habitat by migratory
birds that cross state lines. The Corps eventually refused to issue a
§ 404 permit.59 The consortium filed suit, claiming that the Corps
had "exceeded its statutory authority in interpreting the CWA to
53. Id. at 134-35.
54. Id. at 135.
55. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
56. Id. at 163.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 164.
59. Id. at 164-65. The Corps, after originally declining to extend
jurisdiction, was contacted about the presence of 121 bird species at the site.
The Corps refused to issue the § 404 permit because the impact on migratory
birds was unmitigatable. Id.
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cover non-navigable, isolated, intrastate waters based upon the
presence of migratory birds."
60
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected Corps jurisdiction over
the landfill site pursuant to the "Migratory Bird Rule." 61  The
Court based its holding partly on the need for the term "navigable"
in the CWA to have some impact---"[t]he term 'navigable' has at
least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its
authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over
waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could
reasonably be so made."
62
The Court declined to defer to the Corps' regulatory authority,
as it had in Riverside Bayview Homes, out of a prudential desire
not to tackle what it considered serious constitutional questions
about the scope of Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause.63 The Court carefully explained that SWANCC did not
affect the previous holding in Riverside Bayview Homes. It found
that the "significant nexus" between the wetlands and the adjacent
navigable waters informed its reading of the CWA in Riverside
Bayview Homes.64 By contrast, the Court declined to extend
Riverside Bayview Homes to cover isolated ponds wholly located
in two Illinois counties because such ponds served as a migratory
bird habitat.65 The Corps had failed to prove a significant nexus
between the non-navigable ponds and a navigable waterway.
The dissent in SWANCC found the majority's emphasis on
traditional navigability misplaced. Instead, it focused more on the
definition of "navigable waters" in the CWA itself---"the waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas." 66 According to
the dissent, that definition required neither actual nor potential
navigability in fact.
67
Following SWANCC, lower courts developed conflicting ideas
concerning the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water
60. Id. at 165-66.
61. Id. at 174.
62. Id. at 172.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 167.
65. Id. at 171-72.
66. Id. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
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Act.68  The Fifth Circuit in particular read SWANCC broadly,
finding that a body of water was subject to regulation only if the
water is actually navigable or is adjacent to an open body of
navigable water.69 The Fifth Circuit also found that the CWA is
not broad enough to impose regulations over "tributaries" that are
neither themselves navigable nor adjacent to navigable waters. 70
Other circuits have interpreted SWANCC narrowly, ruling that it
only invalidated jurisdiction over isolated waters or tributaries of
other navigable bodies of water if based solely upon the
"Migratory Bird Rule."
71
If the split between the various circuits about the impact of
SWANCC seems confusing, it is because SWANCC's impact was,
in fact, confusing. One commentator suggested that it was not
only the federal circuits having a difficult time interpreting
SWANCC.72  Gregory Broderick noted that the Bush
Administration refused to take a definitive stance on the issue
73
when the EPA declined to to promulgate new regulations after a
Notice of Proposed Rulemakin, in 2003 to clarify the definition of
"waters of the United States." 4 In doing so, the Administration
had punted the issue to the courts, hoping for a judicial resolution
"to this complex and politically charged problem."
75
68. Gregory T. Broderick, From Migratory Birds to Migratory Molecules:
The Continuing Battle Over the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under the Clean
Water Act, 30 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 473 (2005). Broderick is a staff attorney for
the Pacific Legal Foundation-the organization representing Rapanos. Id. at 473.
69. D.E. Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 268-69 (5th Cir.
2001).
70. In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2003). Note that both Rice
and Needham were interpreting the Oil Pollution Act by reference to the Clean
Water Act, because both acts provide substantially identical jurisdictional
language.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 356 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2004)
(rejecting Phillips' claim that the Clean Water Act, after SWANCC, does not
apply to tributaries of navigable waterways); Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc., LLP,
344 F.3d 407, 415-17 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that the Court only struck down
the "Migratory Bird Rule" and that the Corps continues to properly assert
jurisdiction "over any branch of a tributary system that eventually flows into a
navigable body of water," and that "tributary" includes the entire tributary
system into a navigable body of water (quoting United States v. Deaton, 332
F.3d 698, 711 (4th Cir. 2003))).
72. See Broderick, supra note 68, at 497.
73. Id. at 498 n.166.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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III. RAPANOS CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT AND THE
SUPREME COURT
A. The Sixth Circuit's Entry into the (Civil) Intrigue of Wetlands
Permitting
The Sixth Circuit entered the post-SWANCC fray in 2004 for a
second time in the Rapanos civil case. 76 By 2004, the Rapanos
criminal case had been remanded three times, once by the Supreme
Court, during a decade of litigation. 77 Rapanos filed for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court after his criminal conviction was
upheld by the Sixth Circuit.78 Certiorari was granted, but only to
remand the case back to the Sixth Circuit in light of SWANCC.
79
The Sixth Circuit then remanded back to the district court,80 which
found that SWANCC had changed the scope of federal jurisdiction.
As a result, the district court ruled that the wetlands on Rapanos'
property were not covered because they were not directly adjacent
to navigable waters. 81 The government appealed, which brought
the criminal case before the Sixth Circuit a second time.82 On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, upholding
Rapanos' conviction and finding that the wetlands at issue were
covered by the CWA.83 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
One year later, the Sixth Circuit decided the Rapanos civil
case. 84  The wetlands at issue in the civil case connect to the
Labozinski Drain (a one-hundred year old manmade drain), which
flows into Hoppler Creek, which flows into the Kawkawlin River,
76. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004).
77. Id. at 633 (citing remand by the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Rapanos,
115 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1997); remand for resentencing by the Sixth Circuit,
United States v. Rapanos, 235 F.3d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 2000); and remand by the
Supreme Court, Rapanos v. United States, 533 U.S. 913 (2001)). See supra note
7 for more on the complicated procedural history of this case.
78. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 633.
79. Id. (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001)).
80. Id. (citing United States v. Rapanos, 16 F. App'x 345 (6th Cir. 2001)).
81. Id. (citing United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1015-16
(E.D. Mich. 2001)).
82. Id. at 633-34 (citing United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 454 (6th
Cir. 2003)).
83. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447.
84. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629.
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a navigable river that eventually flows into Saginaw Bay and Lake
Huron.85 In 1988, Rapanos started to clear trees and eradicate the
wetlands on the property. 86 He hired a land consultant after being
advised that he needed a wetlands permit; the consultant found
between forty-eight and fifty-eight acres of wetlands on the
property.87 Rapanos began filling the wetlands with earth and sand
in spite of a cease-and-desist order. He instructed the consultant to
destroy any records of his inventory and then threatened to fire and
sue him if he refused.88
During the government's civil appeal to the Sixth Circuit in
2004, Rapanos repeated the argument made in his criminal case
that SWANCC had changed the scope of federal jurisdiction, and
therefore, the wetlands on his property were no longer covered by
the CWA.89 By reference to its 2003 criminal decision, the Sixth
Circuit denied his claim. The Sixth Circuit interpreted SWANCC
to require a hydrological connection between non-navigable
wetlands and other navigable waters. For the Sixth Circuit, the
"significant nexus" referred to in SWANCC was satisfied by the
presence of a hydrological connection and did not require a "direct
abutment" between the navigable and non-navigable waters.
9
'
The court distinguished SWANCC as involving isolated waters,
whereas the Rapanos wetlands were hydrologically interconnected
with traditional navigable waters. 9 2  The court found a nexus
between a navigable waterway and its non-navigable tributaries.
93
This nexus was sufficient for the Corps to determine that it had
jurisdiction over the whole tributary system of any navigable
waterway.
94
85. Id. at 642.
86. Id. at 632.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 642.
90. Id. at 639.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 642.
93. Id. at 640 (quoting United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 452 (6th
Cir. 2003)).
94. Id.
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B. The Pressure to Grant Certiorari
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari came amidst heady
debate between commentators about the implications of Rapanos
for future environmental endeavors.95 One noted that a positive
outcome for Rapanos was the equivalent of a judicially sanctioned
CWA "opt-out" provision for certain polluters. Another
concluded that the Sixth Circuit's decision upholding the Corps'
jurisdiction "further defined the scope of the Clean Water Act"
which had previously been ambiguous. 97 Jim Murphy, an attorney
with the National Wildlife Federation, called a possible court-
sanctioned curtailment of federal wetland regulatory authority
"catastrophic for the protection of clean water and aquatic
habitat." 98  Rapanos stated that the government's vigorous
prosecution was nothin9 more than a targeted attempt to bankrupt a
private property owner.
If we had taken all the money I spent [on defense] and all
the money the government spent, we could have built
thousands and thousands of acres of wetlands to be
preserved in perpetuity .... But no! The government's not
interested in wetlands but in finding a target somewhere
and hanging it... for everyone to see.
So, what is it? Is the government's nearly two-decade long
action against Rapanos merely an attempt to "bankrupt" a private
property owner on behalf of overzealous tree-huggers? After the
95. Joel B. Eisen, Rapanos, Carabell, and the Isolated Man, 40 U. RICH. L.
REv. 1099 (2006).
96. Id. at 1103.
97. Brett J. Miller, Environmental Law-Clean Water Act-A Wetland Falls
Under Federal Jurisdiction Even Though It Is Located Twenty Miles from the
Nearest Navigable Waterway Due to a "Significant Nexus" Created by a
Manmade Drain Connecting Two Bodies of Water, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
497, 500 (2005).
98. Daily News Staff & Associated Press, Rapanos Awaits Supreme Court
Arguments, MIDLAND DAILY NEWS, Oct. 12, 2005, at IA, available at
http://www.ourMidland.com/site/news.cfin?newsid= 15372401 &BRD=2289&P
AG=461 &dept id=472542&rfi=6.
99. Associated Press & Cheryl Wade, Rapanos Avoids Prison, MIDLAND
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 16, 2005, at IA.
100. Id. Note that Rapanos could have easily spent that money, probably
less, on actually applying for a permit.
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Sixth Circuit's criminal and civil decisions upholding the Corps'
jurisdiction, Ralph Wirtz, a reporter who followed the Rapanos
developments, posited this scenario:
Let's say your Little Johnny takes his little beach shovel
and his little beach bucket and he fills a pothole with sand
from the bucket.
Now, let's say that the pothole is on the edge of a wetland
that's adjacent to a ditch in your backyard.
Now, let's say that the water from that ditch empties four
miles away into a little creek that flows through a wooded
area and that it connects, an additional eight miles away, to
a bubbling stream. The stream then connects after about
eight more miles to a tiny river used by people with small
fishing boats. A few miles further, the small river connects
to a bay on which large ships transport goods to other states
and to other nations.
Does the relationship between the pothole and the river
and the bay, however tenuous and tiny, mean that the
federal government can come into your yard and charge
your Little Johnny with violating the Clean Water Act?
You betcha, says the federal government. 101
Wirtz's scare tactic is not a new view about the scope of federal
"intrusion" into the lives of private property owners. It is the view
espoused by the Pacific Legal Foundation, Rapanos' counsel,
which was founded as "a potent representative in the courts for
Americans who have grown weary of overregulation by big
government, overindulgence by the courts, and excessive
interference in the American way of life."'
0 2
Or, is the action against Rapanos the EPA's way of fulfilling
congressional intent towards wetland regulation-an intent to
101. Ralph E. Wirtz, Rapanos Wetland Case Could Be Heard by Supreme
Court This Session, MIDLAND DAILY NEWS, Oct. 05, 2005, at IA (emphasis
added), available at http://www.ourMidland.com/site/news.cfn?newsid =
15331165&BRD=2289&PAG=461&deptid=472542&rfi=6. Wirtz's scenario
seemed to this author to form the extremist view of the debate between
environmentalists and developers.
102. Pacific Legal Foundation, About Us, http://www.pacificlegal.org/?
mvcTask-about (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
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make wetlands, even those in Michigan, an asset of the national
polity?
[M]arshes and wetlands are not a parochial responsibility or
an asset; they are not a local asset; they are a national asset.
They are not just confined within boundaries which happen
to exist for any one of our States .... They belong to all
citizens. They are much too valuable to be abandoned to
some unstable, fragmentary kind of protection.1
0 3
It is against this tense backdrop that Rapanos was decided; or
rather, not decided.
C. The Punt Back to the Supreme Court: You Know What They
Say-There Are Three Sides to Every Issue
In February 2006, finally having his case heard before the
Supreme Court, Rapanos made a bold prediction: "It's going to be
close.... Six to three, five to four in our favor."' 1 4 What he got,
however, was neither six to three, five to four, nor necessarily in
his favor. Instead, he got a four-four-one decision and another
visit to the Sixth Circuit.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Rapanos and a
consolidated case, Carabell v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,'0 5 presumably in order to clarify two things left unclear
after SWANCC. Those two things were the definition of
103. 123 CONG. REc. 26,716-17 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977) (statement of
Senator Chafee of Rhode Island, debating a bill proposed by Senator Lloyd
Bensten offered in 1977 to amend the Clean Water Act to limit the scope of the
§ 404 program to only traditionally navigable waterways and their adjacent
wetlands; the bill was ultimately defeated by a full Senate vote). See also Brief
of the Honorable John D. Dingell et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Respondent, Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (Nos. 04-1034,
14-1384). All amici were members of either the 92nd Congress, which in 1972
initially adopted the definitions in the Clean Water Act at issue in Rapanos, or
the 95th Congress, which voted in 1977 to reaffirm the broad scope of waters
provided by the Clean Water Act. The consequences of fragmentary wetland
protection hit home with a vengeance in 2005, after it was revealed that the poor
state of Louisiana's coastal wetlands contributed to the destruction caused by
Hurricane Katrina.
104. Ralph E. Wirtz, Rapanos: It'll Be Close, MIDLAND DAILY NEWS, Feb.
22, 2006, at 2A, available at http://www.ourMidland.com/site/news.cftn?newsid
= 16175331 &BRD=2289&PAG=461 &deptld=472542&rfi=6.
105. 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004).
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"adjacency," in terms of a non-navigable waterway being adjacent
to navigable body of water, and the scope of the "significant
nexus" between the two in order to confer federal jurisdiction over
the non-navigable waterway. In both Rapanos and Carabell, the
non-navigable waterways in question were wetlands.
While Rapanos was fighting the Corps to avoid getting a
permit, the Carabells were fighting the Corps because it denied
them a permit. The Carabells wanted to fill approximately sixteen
acres of wetlands to construct a condominium complex. 10 6 A man-
made berm separated the sixteen acres, one of the last remaining
large forested wetland parcels in Macomb County, Michigan, from
a drain that empties into Auvase Creek, which empties into Lake
St. Clair.10 7 The Corps denied their permit request because of
concerns over an increased risk of erosion and water quality
degradation in Lake St. Clair. 108 The Sixth Circuit upheld the
permit denial, finding that it was a proper exercise of jurisdiction
over wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waterways. 1°9
Corps regulations specified that "adjacent" wetlands also included
those separated from other waters by berms, man-made dikes, or
barriers. I
°
The Justices split three ways over what the Corps must show to
establish jurisdiction over a particular non-navigable waterway.
Four Justices (Team One) found that the Corps could assert
jurisdiction over a non-navigable wetland if the wetland possessed
a continuous surface connection to a permanent navigable body of
water. Four others (Team Two) found that the Corps could assert
jurisdiction if the non-navigable wetland had an ecological effect
on a navigable waterway. Justice Kennedy found that the Corps
could assert jurisdiction if the non-navigable wetland possessed a
significant nexus with a navigable waterway or tributary thereof.
106. Id. at 705.
107. Id. A berm is a protective mound or bank of earth. THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000).
108. Carabell, 391 F.3d at 706.
109. Id. at 708.
110. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (2007).
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1. Team One: Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito l1
The plurality held that in order to be subject to the § 404 permit
program, a non-navigable wetland must have a "significant nexus"
to a traditionally navigable waterway. 1 2 This nexus means that
the non-navigable waterway must be both adjacent to and possess a
surface water connection with the navigable waterway." 3  The
plurality voted to remand both cases back to the Sixth Circuit for
further consideration in light of this standard." 14
Justice Scalia began the plurality's opinion with a short history
of the Corps' expanding regulatory jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction over areas not traditionally thought of as "waters.""' IA
It was important to the plurality that "dredged or fill materials,"
"unlike traditional water pollutants . . . do not readily wash
downstream." ' 1 6 The Corps' regulations provided that "the waters
of the United States . . . include, in addition to traditional . . .
navigable waters, . . . [a]ll other waters such as . . . streams
(including intermittent streams)... [t]ributaries of [such] waters;...
[and w]etlands adjacent to [such] waters [and tributaries]."' 7
Following SWANCC, the Corps did not amend its published
regulations; instead it notified field staff to continue exercising
jurisdiction over the tributary systems and adjacent wetlands of
traditional navigable waters and waters "'neighboring' traditional
111. Interestingly, he did (possibly, if the case goes Rapanos' way on
remand) get Justice Alito. His attorney, Julie Kiel, had, at the same press
conference where Rapanos made his bet, predicted that he would not get support
from Alito. See Wirtz, supra note 104.
112. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
113. Id. at 2227.
114. Id. at 2235. Justice Scalia found that the Corps had exercised
jurisdiction over "any parcel of land containing a channel or conduit-whether
man-made or natural, broad or narrow, permanent or ephemeral--through which
rainwater or drainage may occasionally or intermittently flow." Id. at 2215.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2216. It is important to note, as Justice Scalia did, that sand and
spoil are specifically identified as pollutants in the CWA.
117. Id. (citing 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3), (5), (7), which regulations specifically
provide that "[w]etlands separated from other waters of the United States by
man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are
'adjacent wetlands').
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navigable waters and their tributaries."" 8  Recognizing the
difficulty of reconciling differing federal circuit opinions after
SWANCC, the plurality concluded that the Corps had broadly
regulated those areas it considered "tributaries" and "adjacent"
wetlands. 11 9
The plurality framed the issue of whether four wetlands that
"lie near ditches or manmade drains that eventually" enter "into
traditional navigable waters" were "waters of the United States."' 2 °
In both Rapanos and Carabell, the Sixth Circuit had affirmed
jurisdiction because the wetlands involved were adjacent to
navigable waters or tributaries of navigable waters.' 21  The
plurality reasoned that it was not necessary to decide the extent to
which the term "navigable" restricts the coverage of the CWA,
because the CWA applies only to "waters."''
22
For the plurality, the Corps' regulatory interpretation was not a
reasonable construction of the term "waters."' 23  The plurality
defined "the waters" of the United States narrowly to include water
"[als found in streams and bodies forming geographical features
such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes," or "the flowing or moving
masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or
bodies."' 124 Justice Scalia found it relevant that the definition of
"navigable waters" in the CWA was not "waters of the United
States" but "the waters of the United States."'125 According to the
118. Id. at 2217 (quoting 68 Fed. Reg. 1998 and 68 Fed. Reg. 1997). The
Corps continued to defend its broad interpretation in court "even after
SWANCC's excision of 'isolated' waters and wetlands from the Act's coverage."
Id. at 2218.
119. Id. (citing Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc., LLP, 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir.
2003) for the proposition that a tributary includes the "intermittent flow of
surface water through ... 2.4 miles of natural streams and manmade ditches";
United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) for the conclusion that a
roadside ditch was a tributary when its water ended up in Chesapeake Bay).
Constructions of an "adjacent" wetland have included hydrological connections
through a "directional sheet flow" and wetlands lying within the '100-year
floodplain' of a body of water." Id.
120. Id. at 2219.
121. Id. (citing United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004);
Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004)).
122. Id. at 2220.
123. Id. at 2220.
124. Id. at 2220-21 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2882 (2d ed. 1954)).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
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plurality, for the "the" in the definition to have any significance, it
has to mean more than "water in general.' 26  From this the
plurality concluded that for a waterway to be part of "the waters of
the United States," it must be a continuously present, fixed body of
water as opposed to an ordinary dry channel through which water
occasionally flows.1
27
Conversely, then, "the waters of the United States" would not
include channels with merely "intermittent or ephemeral flow."
128
According to the plurality, this construction of "the waters of the
United States" accorded with both Riverside Bayview Homes and
SWANCC, in that both cases described necessary jurisdiction over
areas with "hydrographic features more conventionally identified
as waters.',
129
After determining that "the waters of the United States" do
"not include channels through which water flows intermittently or
ephemerally," the plurality then addressed whether a wetland can
be "adjacent to" remote "waters of the United States" because of a
"mere hydrologic connection."'130  According to the plurality,
SWANCC rejected the deference given to the Corps in Riverside
Bayview Homes based upon its "ecological judgment about the
relationship between waters and . . . adjacent wetlands.''
SWANCC limited that deference insofar as ecological
considerations "provided an independent basis for including . . .
'wetlands' within 'the waters of the United States."" 3 2 SWANCC
thus narrowed the scope of the Corps' ecological considerations to
only those that resolve ambiguities in favor of treating abutting
wetlands as "waters."' 33  Therefore, only wetlands with a
continuous surface connection to bodies that are "waters of the
126. Id. at 2222.
127. Id. at 2223. The plurality did note, however, that it does not mean to
exclude rivers, streams, or lakes that may dry up in circumstances like drought,
or those that are seasonal in nature. Id. at 2221 n.5.
128. Id. at 2222.
129. Id. The plurality viewed as persuasive the language in the CWA that
defines "discharge of a pollutant" as the addition of a pollutant to navigable
waters from a "point source." Accordingly, if ditches, channels, and conduits
("through which water flows intermittently") were "waters" and not "point
sources," the definition of point source would have no meaning. Id. at 2222-23.
130. Id. at 2225.
131. Id. at 2226.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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United States" (as in those with no "intermittent or ephemeral
flow"), such that there is no clear dividing line between the two,
are "adjacent" to such waters and covered by the CWA. 134
Likewise, those wetlands that have only an intermittent, remote
hydrologic connection lack the "significant nexus" sufficient to
confer federal jurisdiction, even if those wetlands are next to
navigable water bodies.'
35
Based upon these determinations, the plurality remanded both
cases back to the Sixth Circuit to determine whether Rapanos' and
Carabell's wetlands were "waters.'36 To be "waters," the
wetlands must exist in the ordinary sense of creating a "relatively
permanent flow," and if "the wetlands in question are 'adjacent"'
to permanent waters, there must be by a "continuous surface
connection" between the two.'
3 7
2. Team Two: Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
The dissent would have upheld the Corps' jurisdiction over
both sets of wetlands because the wetlands, which are adjacent to
tributaries of navigable waters, have a cumulative ecological effect
on navigable waters.' 38 All four Rapanos dissenters also dissented
in SWANCC. 139 The dissent in SWANCC heavily emphasized
Congress's intent in enacting the "watershed" legislation known as
the CWA, citing the 1969 fire in the Cuyahoga River in Ohio.
140
The Cuyahoga River burned on account of being coated with a
slick of industrial waste. 41 In order to protect all the Nation's
waters, the dissent argued, the Corps' interpretation of the CWA to
extend to tributaries of navigable waters and wetlands adjacent to
each, was "manifestly reasonable."'
142
134. Id. at 2222, 2226.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2235.
137. Id. at 2227.
138. Id. at 2252-66.
139. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
140. Id. at 175.
141. Id. See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing A
History of Environmental Protection, 14 FoRDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2002) for an
account of the fire suggesting that it was less severe than generally believed.
142. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 192.
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According to the same dissenters in Rapanos, the SWANCC
holding did not control disposition of either Rapanos or
Carabell.14 3 For the dissent, "SWANCC had nothing to say about
wetlands, . . . let alone about wetlands adjacent to traditionally
navigable waters or their tributaries."' 44 Rapanos and Carabell
were, therefore, squarely within the purview of Riverside Bayview
Homes.145 The dissent viewed Rapanos as merely an extension of
Riverside Bayview Homes, in that the wetlands at issue "abut
tributaries of traditionally navigable waters,"'146 rather than
abutting traditional navigable waters themselves. The dissent
noted the roles of wetlands such as nesting and spawning sites for
aquatic or land species, "storage areas for storm and flood waters,"
and water purification. 147  It viewed these roles not as
"independent" ecological functions (as classified by the plurality),
but rather as "'integral' to the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters"--the very things the Clean Water
Act was designed to restore. 1
48
The "significant nexus" between the adjacent wetlands and
navigable waterway necessary to support Corps' jurisdiction, for
the dissenters, was not a surface connection to a navigable body of
water (as seen by the plurality). 149 It was, rather, a "significant
nexus" between the wetlands adjacent to tributaries and a
"watershed's water quality."' 50
As to the plurality's view that "the waters of the United States"
do not refer to intermittent or ephemeral waters, the dissent argued
that under such analysis the Corps could "regulate polluters who
dump dredge into a stream that flows year round," yet not a
polluter dumping "into a neighboring stream that flows for only
290 days a year"--even though both may have the same effects on
downstream water quality. 151
143. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2208, 2252-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2256.
145. Id. at 2256-57.
146. Id. at 2257.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)).
149. Id. at 2258.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2259-60. Justice Scalia does seem to address this argument,
noting that it may be possible to regulate the polluter dumping into a
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For the dissenters, the wetlands in each case were not
"isolated," like the mine pit ponds in SWANCC, but rather
"adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters," and thus
more similar to Riverside Bayview Homes.' 2 The dissent took the
plurality to task for "plainly neglect[ing] to consult a dictionary"
regarding the requirement that an adjacent body of water possess a
"continuous surface connection" to other navigable waters. 53
Justice Stevens found that, according to the dictionary (even
Justice Scalia's "preferred Webster's Second"), 154 an adjacent
body of water also includes one lying close to ("but not necessarily
in actual contact" with) a navigable body of water.15 5  His
chastising about the dictionary, however, seems slight in
comparison to his statement about the plurality's "antagonism to
environmentalism."
56
The dissent, therefore, would have upheld the Corps'
jurisdiction over Rapanos' and Carabell's wetlands because the
wetlands, which are adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters,
have a "significant nexus" (cumulative ecological effect) to those
waters sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the Corps'
regulations. 1
57
3. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence: Is I > 4?
Justice Kennedy concurred in remanding Rapanos and
Carabell back to the Sixth Circuit to determine whether a
significant nexus existed between the non-navigable wetlands and
other waters "navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so
neighboring stream if the neighboring stream is viewed as a "point source." Id.
at 2227 (plurality opinion).
152. Id. at 2262 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2263.
154. Id. In Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), Circuit
Judge Learned Hand was careful to admonish the legal field for placing too
much reliance on the dictionary as a primary tool of statutory construction,
noting "it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence
not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always
have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."
155. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2263.
156. Id. at 2259 n.8.
157. Id. at 2264-65.
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made."' 58  He defined significant nexus differently than the
plurality, however. According to Kennedy, neither the plurality
nor the dissent correctly addressed the "significant nexus" test
established by SWANCC.
Kennedy examined Riverside Bayview Homes and SWANCC
together as establishing the framework to determine whether the
Rapanos or Carabell wetlands were covered by the CWA. 15 9 For
Kennedy, under Riverside Bayview Homes, a non-navigable
wetland is a "navigable water" if the connection between the
wetland and the navigable water is so close that is difficult to
determine where one ends and the other begins. CWA jurisdiction
is lacking, under SWANCC, when there is not a "significant nexus"
between the two. 1
60
He found the plurality's insistence upon permanent standing
water or a continuous flow to be nonsensical. 161 Justice Kennedy
reasoned that the plurality's definition of "waters" was too
restrictive, finding that the Corps could reasonably interpret the
Clean Water Act to cover intermittent streams. 
162
Also lacking in support, according to Justice Kennedy, was the
plurality's reliance on Riverside Bayview Homes to support the
proposition that a wetland must have an indistinguishable surface
connection with other navigable waters. 163 He noted that Riverside
Bayview Homes recognized an overinclusive definition of
navigable waters. 164 Finding that the Corps' expansive definition
of adjacency was a reasonable one, he recognized that, in many
158. Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 2241.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2242. Justice Kennedy found that under such an approach, "the
merest trickle, if continuous, would count as a 'water' subject to federal
regulation, while torrents thundering at irregular intervals through otherwise dry
channels would not." Id.
162. Id. at 2243.
163. Id. at 2244.
164. Id. Under Riverside Bayview Homes, "an overinclusive definition is
permissible even when it reaches wetlands holding moisture disconnected from
adjacent water-bodies." Id. at 2244 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135 & n.9 (1985)).
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cases, the absence of an interchange of waters prior to dredging
and filling makes protection of the wetlands critical.16
5
Justice Kennedy generally chastised the plurality for its overall
tone and approach, which, to him, seemed "unduly dismissive" of
the public interests served by the Clean Water Act and the general
protection of wetlands. 1
66
While concurring in the judgment to remand, Justice Kennedy
disagreed not only with the plurality's "read[ing] nonexistent
requirements into the Act," but also with the dissent's "read[ing] a
central requirement out"-navigability.' 67 In order to give the
term "navigable" some meaning, he found that jurisdiction
depends upon a "'significant nexus' between the wetlands in
question" and traditional navigable waters.' 68 That nexus is met if
the wetlands "significantly affect the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity" of other traditionally navigable waters. 16
9
When a "wetland's effects on water quality are" insubstantial or
speculative, it is not encompassed in "navigable waters."'170
Justice Kennedy found the current regulation of tributaries too
broad to justify an across-the-board standard that a non-navigable
wetland adjacent to a tributary of a navigable water is covered
under the CWA. 17 1 Under the regulations, a water is "a tributary if
it feeds into a traditional navigable water (or a tributary
thereof)."' 172  For Justice Kennedy, this standard left too much
room for regulation of ditches and streams remote from navigable
in fact waters. 1
73
He concurred in the remand, because, in his opinion, neither
the Corps nor the reviewing courts properly considered whether a
165. Id. at 2245-46. This is because wetlands separated from a navigable
water by a manmade barrier can hold flood water, impurities, or runoff that
would instead flow into navigable waters.
166. Id. at 2246.
167. Id. at 2247.
168. Id. at 2248.
169. Id. The nexus has to be assessed in terms of the structure and purpose
of the Clean Water Act.
170. Id.
171. Id. at2249.
172. Id. (citing 33 CFR § 328.3(e) (2005)). Under the regulations, a tributary
must also possess an "ordinary high water mark." Id.
173. Id.
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significant nexus existed under the principles he articulated. 174 For
Rapanos in particular, he noted that the same evidence that
established that his wetlands had surface water connections to
tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters should provide the requisite
significant nexus.' 75  However, with that evidence, the Sixth
Circuit had concluded that a significant nexus can be established
solely by a hydrologic connection. For Justice Kennedy, a solely
hydrological connection was not enough to confer jurisdiction
unless it creates a significant impact on downstream water
quality.
176
IV. IMPACTS OF A MURKY DECISION
A. Ambiguous State of the Law
Presumably, the Supreme Court grants certiorari in order to
clarify the state of the law. One would assume that the Supreme
Court does not need to intervene into a controversy absent either
lower courts' misapplication of, or conflicting interpretations of, a
particular law. With Rapanos, the Court had the chance to do just
that-clarify the interpretation of a particular law (the Clean Water
Act) that had been given arguably conflicting interpretations by
lower circuits.
177
In Rapanos, the Supreme Court failed to perform this basic
responsibility. The five member plurality that agreed to remand
the cases back to the Sixth Circuit did so in order to determine a
question of fact. That question was: Did the wetlands at issue in
either case possess a significant nexus to a navigable body of water
over which the Army Corps of Engineers has regulatory
jurisdiction, sufficient to bring the wetlands within the ambit of the
§ 404 permit program for dredged or fill material? A remand to
determine a factual dispute in light of the Court's interpretation of
the Clean Water Act is a reasonable disposition of the case. The
Sixth Circuit, however, has to answer this question in light of
differing interpretations of what this "significant nexus" actually is.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2250.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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Both the plurality and Justice Kennedy remanded the case back
to the Sixth Circuit to determine if a significant nexus exists
between the non-navigable wetlands and other navigable waters.
Under the plurality's approach, a significant nexus exists only
when a non-navigable wetland meets two requirements. First, a
continuous surface connection must exist that is sufficient to be
hydrologically adjacent. Second, the wetland itself must be
adjacent to a traditionally navigable body of water that is relatively
permanent (as part of "the waters of the United States"). Under
Justice Kennedy's approach, a significant nexus exists to confer
jurisdiction over a non-navigable wetland on a case-by-case basis
when, even in the absence of a continuous surface connection,
filling the wetland would have a significant ecological effect upon
a traditionally navigable body of water or a major navigable
tributary thereof.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggested that on remand,
Justice Kennedy's approach would be the one most likely taken by
lower courts.'17  His prediction has already come to fruition. In
United States v. Gerke Excavating, the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that Justice Kennedy's jurisdictional approach controls, based upon
a prudential rule that "when a majority of the Supreme Court
agrees only on the outcome of a case and not on the ground for that
outcome, lower-court judges are to follow the narrowest ground to
which a majority of the Justices would have assented if forced to
choose."' 179  The Gerke court found that Justice Kennedy's
178. 126 S. Ct. at 2265-66 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He assumed this
because Justice Kennedy's approach conferred jurisdiction over more of the
Nation's waters. He further noted that for future litigation, the United States
could use either test to prove jurisdiction. Id. at 2265; see also United States v.
Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that the U.S. can assert jurisdiction
over wetland sites if the site meets either Justice Kennedy's legal standard or
that of the plurality). The First Circuit noted that allowing jurisdiction under
both standards would be appropriate because it "ensures that lower courts will
find jurisdiction in all cases where a majority of the Court would support" a
jurisdictional finding. Id. at 2264. If Justice Kennedy's standard is met, he
"plus the four dissenters would" uphold "jurisdiction"; likewise, if the
plurality's test is met, the four dissenters and the four plurality members would
uphold jurisdiction. Id.
179. 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). Note that this prudential rule is inapposite to the
prediction by Justice Stevens that Kennedy's approach would control because it
is the narrowest opinion that would presumably extend the CWA to waters that
the plurality would not reach. See also Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64 (noting that the
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approach was narrower insofar as it reigns in federal authority in
most cases. 180 Presumably, the four plurality Justices, if forced to
choose, would choose the approach that allows for no federal
regulation.' 8 1 The Gerke court found that the plurality's holding
was broader insofar as it found jurisdiction over wetlands
possessing a surface water connection (however small), with
traditionally navigable waters even if the cumulative effects on the
navigable water were speculative or insubstantial. 1
82
For the distinction between Justice Kennedy's approach and
the plurality's to have any meaning, one would need to show that a
non-navigable wetland with a surface connection to a navigable
body of water or its tributary, if filled, would not have a significant
effect on the water quality of the abutting navigable waterway or
tributary. However, filling a non-navigable wetland that has a
surface connection to a navigable body of water necessarily
eradicates the connection between the two. Eradicating the
connection between the two would confer a significant nexus.
Urban planning initiatives, such as draining and filling
wetlands to build a shopping mall or condo complex, indirectly
affect wetlands by causing changes in hydrology and
sedimentation. 183 Hydrologic change, which concerns the quantity,
duration, rates, and frequency of water flow, is thought of as the
"linchpin" of wetland health because substantial change is the
central way to impair various wetland functions.' 84  Therefore,
filling a wetland necessarily effects a hydrologic change. If the
wetland is connected through a continuous surface flow to a
navigable body of water or tributary thereof, hydrologic change
necessarily affects the navigable body of water.
Gerke interpretation of Marks does not translate easily to a situation such as that
of Rapanos, and eschewing the approach in favor of Justice Stevens's advice in
Rapanos to find jurisdiction under either the plurality's standard or Justice
Kennedy's).
180. Id. at 724-25 (remanding the case back to the district court to conduct
fact-finding consistent with the Kennedy approach).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. AMANDA L. Azous & RICHARD R. HORNER, WETLANDS AND
URBANIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 5 (2001).
184. Id. at 6.
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In addition, urbanized watersheds generate large amounts of
pollutants, including eroded soil from construction sites. Larger
quantities of pollutants reduce water filtration capacity and
accelerate the transport and addition of sediments to wetlands.'
85
Let us assume that Rapanos, while filling his wetlands,
contemporaneously began developing non-wetland areas for his
shopping mall. Construction debris, sediment, dry concrete, paint
chippings, and tiny pieces of drywall would all accompany such a
project. Since there is an "intimate connection between runoff
pollution and wetland hydrology,"' 86 one can rationally assume
that the runoff generated from construction would affect the
wetland's hydrology. If the main functions of wetland areas are to
filter sediment and debris and prevent those things from entering
into navigable bodies of water and their tributaries, then filling
Rapanos' wetlands necessarily pushes the construction debris into
tributaries and navigable water bodies. For Rapanos, given the
position of his wetlands, some of the sediment logically ends up in
the Kawkawlin River and Lake Huron.
Rapanos has not been fighting for almost two decades for the
right to fill the wetlands on his property, or rather, to escape
imposed penalties for doing so. Rapanos has been fighting for
almost two decades merely because he did not want to apply for a
§ 404 wetland fill permit. The Clean Water Act § 404 program is a
permit program, not necessarily a restriction upon filling any
wetlands. The convoluted holding in Rapanos does not establish
that a "significant nexus" is necessary in order to allow the
government to forbid a person to develop wetland property. It
merely stands for the proposition that the nexus is required to even
determine if one needs a permit from the Army Corps of
Engineers.
Interestingly, had Rapanos attempted to get a permit, the Corps
probably would have approved it. According to the Corps' § 404
program data, the agency receives an average of over 80,000
permit requests annually; of these, only about nine percent are
required to go through a "detailed evaluation for an individual
permit"; most are approved through a nationwide or region-
185. Id
186. Id.
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specific permit. 187  Of the nine percent that have to file for an
individual permit, less than 0.3 percent are denied. 188 In Louisiana
alone, between 1988 and 1996, ninety-nine percent of all permit
applications were granted, including ninety-two percent in flood
disaster areas.1
89
Under the CWA, the EPA has veto power over a proposed
Corps permit, but in the first thirty-five years of the program, it
used the veto authority only eleven times. 190 It hardly seems that
the Corps has been running rampant to trample the rights of private
property owners, even with broad regulatory interpretations. In
fact, based on these statistics, it would not be unreasonable to
presume the opposite.
As a result of Rapanos, landowners will have to conduct costly,
independent, case-by-case ambiguous scientific analyses merely to
determine if they have to apply for a permit, which has a likelihood
of being approved anyway. More likely, though, landowners like
John Rapanos will ignore the permitting requirements altogether,
in effect forcing the Corps to assume the costly burden of catching
permit-dodgers. Neither scenario seems an efficient or practical
way for the EPA or a private landowner to conduct business. 191
187. Jeffery A. Zinn & Claudia Copeland, Wetlands Issues, in NATIONAL
WETLANDS: ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 8 (Samuel T. Prescott ed., 2004).
188. Id. It is important to note, as the plurality points out, that the individual
permitting process is time-consuming and expensive. Rapanos v. United States,
126 S. Ct. 2208, 2214 (2006). However, if the goal of the Clean Water Act is to
control the pollution of the Nation's navigable waterways at the source, then the
permit option seems to be the best available regulatory scheme. Also, since
almost all individual permits are for industrial or commercial developers, one
would assume that, if the project is approved, a developer could amortize the
cost of the permit over a fifteen year period under 26 U.S.C. § 197(a), (c),
(d)(1)(D) (2006).
189. Brett Hulsey & Geoff Tichenor, A Call for Flood Security Through
Wetland Protection, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSLETTER, May-June 2000, 3-4 (see
table showing flood damage and wetland permits granted in the top ten states for
flood disasters).
190. See Zinn & Copeland, supra note 187, at 8 (based on data available
before publishing in 2004).
191. For more information concerning EPA enforcement under Rapanos, see
Kathleen Schalch, Clean Water Act Enforcement Falls to Active Citizens (NPR
radio broadcast Nov. 7, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=6447306. According to David Bookbinder, Sierra Club
Senior Attorney, "the Corps is going to have to prove that a wetland falls under
the Clean Water Act." Id. The process, according to Bookbinder, is a "very,
very resource-intensive effort." Id. In northern Wisconsin, for example, "only
one in ten builders" that "illegally fill wetlands ever get caught." Id.
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In addition, even if such a process were easy to administer, is it
not the best course of action to require a nexus at the actual permit
stage, rather than at the "determination if a permit is necessary"
stage? Creating this significant nexus condition to determine if a
wetland is part of "the waters of the United States" and therefore
under the purview of the CWA, rather than using it to determine if
a permit should be approved, necessarily fragments an already
fragmentary process. If the Corps found that a fill application had
an insubstantial effect upon a navigable water body or its tributary,
it would only have to issue a permit.
Justice Kennedy approved a significant ecological test of
wetland "nexus-ness ' ' 1 2 independent of a continuous surface
connection to a navigable water body or a navigable tributary
thereof. Given such approval, it is difficult to refine the difference
between his approach and that of the dissent. According to Justice
Kennedy, the dissent reads the requirement of "navigability" out of
the CWA. 19 3 He asserted that it was the dissent's view that the
CWA reaches "all 'non-isolated wetlands,' just as it had construed
the Act to reach the wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters
in Riverside Bayview Homes."'194 However, the dissent only stated
that wetlands that are adjacent to navigable water bodies or
tributaries served water quality roles that lead to a reasonable
interpretation by the Corps that the CWA covers such non-isolated
wetlands. 195 To take this basic premise and transform it into an
overarching statement that the dissent supports jurisdiction over
"all" non-isolated wetlands requires an inference that the dissent
itself had not made.
According to Justice Kennedy, a higher standard than the one
proposed by the dissent is necessary "to avoid unreasonable
applications of the statute," based on the ambiguous overbreadth of
the Corps' definition of "tributary."' 96 However, as already stated,
the Corps approves the vast majority of permit applications. If the
192. It seems to this author that the Justices disagree about the inherent
qualities of a significant nexus. Five agree that a nexus is required; the
deliberation only concerns the essence of a nexus--or rather, "nexus-ness."
193. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2247 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
194. Id. at 2248.
195. Id. at 2256 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2248-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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statute required a permit for filling wetlands that are only
tenuously connected through a tiny drain to a small amount of a
navigable waterway-under the current permitting scheme, the
owner of the wetland area would simply get a permit and mitigate
his wetland damage as required by the Corps.
Given the ecological value of wetlands for flood control, water
purification, species and habitat preservation, and aesthetic
economic use, the better policy is to be over-inclusive rather than
under-inclusive. If the goal of the CWA is to improve the overall
health of the Nation's waterways, over-inclusiveness makes sense
to effectuate this goal. Additionally, pollutants subscribe to the
"easier to add rather than subtract" truism. Controlling the
entrance of pollutants into the Nation's waterways is much more
administratively and economically efficient than attempting to
remove pollutants added through under-inclusive regulation. An
over-inclusive approach is a reasonable construction of the CWA,
given its definition of "navigable waters." Navigable waters are
"waters of the United States," and legislative history indicates that
Congress intended comprehensive legislation not bound to
traditional notions of navigability.
The current mechanisms to regulate water quality have not
totally fulfilled the CWA's statutory mandate. Even with the
permitting program, average annual loss of wetlands still amounts
to more than 58,000 acres per year.' 97 This figure is down eighty
percent from the previous decade.' 98 In addition, of the nine states
that reported to EPA sources of recent wetland losses, four
indicated that filling and draining, residential development, and
urban growth were among the highest causes.1 99 As to overall
water quality, states indicated that approximately forty percent of
streams and forty-five percent of lakes that were assessed were not
clean enough to support fishing and swimming.20 0 Even with the
197. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2000 NATIONAL WATER QuALITY
INVENTORY ch. 5, at 45 (citing Status and Trends of Wetlands in the
Conterminous United States 1986 to 1997, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
National Wetland Inventory), available at http://www.epa.gov/305b/
2000report/.
198. Id.
199. Id.; see id. at 45 fig. 5-4.
200. Id. at 1.
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permit program and other regulations, the CWA has a long way to
go towards effectuating its goal.
B. Possible Impacts on other CWA Discharge Programs
Rapanos could possibly negatively impact other CWA
discharge programs. As mentioned in the introduction to this Note,
the Clean Water Act operates two separate permit programs for
pollutant discharges. 20 1  Section 404, the subject of Rapanos,
regulates permits for dredge or fill material into navigable
202waters. CWA § 402 authorizes permits for the discharge of
other pollutants or combinations of pollutants.20 3 The definition of
"navigable waters" ("the waters of the United States") at issue in
Rapanos also applies to the § 402 program. 2 4  If the result in
Rapanos (that a permit is required only when a "significant nexus"
exists between a non-navigable wetland and navigable waterway or
tributary thereof) applies to § 404 permits, that same result may
apply equally to § 402.205 According to Former Attorney General
Benjamin Civiletti,
[t]he term "navigable waters".., is a linchpin of the Act...,
critical to not only the coverage of 404, but also to coverage
of the other pollution control mechanisms established under
the Act, including the 402 permit program for point source
discharges, the regulation of discharges of oil and hazardous
substances in 311 . . . and the regulation of discharges of
vessel sewage in 312.206
If Rapanos were to extend to other provisions of the CWA,
what would be the result? Under the plurality's analysis, the
discharge of a pollutant into a non-navigable wetland under a §
201. See supra Part II.A.
202. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006).
203. Id. § 1342(a)(1).
204. Id. § 1362(7) (noting that the definitions in § 502 apply, "[e]xcept as
otherwise specifically provided, when used in [this] Act" (emphasis added)).
205. This is, of course, assuming that one could actually determine what a
significant nexus is in each given situation.
206. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 15, 5 (Sept. 5, 1979), quoted in Lance D. Wood,
Don't be Misled: CWA Jurisdiction Extends to All Non-Navigable Tributaries of
the Traditional Navigable Waters and to their Adjacent Wetlands, 34 ELR
10187, 10195 (2004).
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402 permit would face the same test as that under § 404. A
polluter would be required to get a permit if a continuous surface
connection exists between the wetland and a navigable-in-fact
body of water or tributary thereof. This means that other CWA
regulated pollutants, such as solid waste, incinerator residue,
sewage, garbage, sewerage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes,
biological materials, radioactive materials, and industrial and
agricultural waste 207 could be exempt from the permit requirement
by being dumped into a wetland adjacent to, but without a
continuous surface connection to, a navigable waterway. Such a
result is not an unlikely occurrence; under the § 402 program,
approximately twenty-seven percent of the permits for major
industrial dischargers are discharges into intermittent or ephemeral
streams, the two smallest categories of non-navigable tributaries.
20 8
Exempting non-navigable tributaries and adjacent wetlands
from the § 402 permit requirements provides a perverse incentive
for companies to dump waste into those unregulated areas, free
from the economic restraints of permitting and monitoring. When
one is discussing sediment from filling a wetland, relaxing the
permit requirements for non-navigable wetlands and tributaries
may not seem so environmentally detrimental. However, when
one is discussing the discharge of radioactive materials or
incinerator residue, which will wash downstream much more
easily, the result is not nearly as palatable. The United States gets
its drinking water both from the navigable and non-navigable part
of the total tributary system. Therefore, radioactive waste dumped
into the non-navigable portion of the tributary system will become
part of the drinking supply and part of the fish and shellfish that we
eat.209
207. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006).
208. See Wood, supra note 206, at 10195 n.44 (citing statistics from the
National Hydrography Data Set of the U.S. Geological Survey, in response to a
2003 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act
Regulatory Definition of 'Waters of the United States,' published at 68 Fed.
Reg. 1991 (2003)). Justice Scalia posits that such discharges could be regulated
as "point sources." However, this would require that the Corps prove that waste
made it specifically from a tributary-point source into navigable waters, which
brings about the complicated proof issues discussed previously in this Note.
209. Id. at 10196.
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The result for the § 402 program under Justice Kennedy's
approach is not necessarily better. The problems of proof and after
the fact investigation exist just as under the § 404 fill permit
program. An over-inclusive permitting scheme allows the Corps to
regulate incinerator waste discharge into non-navigable tributaries
at the source, rather than through an ad hoc approach. Also, if
Plant A and Plant B both dumped incinerator waste into a non-
navigable tributary, it would be difficult to determine which waste
from which plant had the significant ecological effect on the
navigable waterway. Perhaps a better option would be to establish
a presumption that filling a non-navigable wetland or dumping
waste into a non-navigable tributary creates a significant effect on
an adjacent navigable waterway. This way, the burden shifts to the
polluter to demonstrate that filling a wetland or dumping waste
would not affect the navigable waterway.
Justice Scalia indicated that the Rapanos result may not apply
to determine jurisdiction under the § 402 program. He noted that
although the Court did not decide the issue, "there is no reason to
suppose that our construction today significantly affects the
enforcement of § 1342 [§ 402], inasmuch as lower courts applying
§ 1342 have not characterized intermittent channels as 'waters of
the United States."' 2 0 To the plurality, the fact that pollutants
other than fill or dredged material naturally wash downstream is
significant enough to distinguish the two programs. 21 1 However,
the CWA classifies both incinerator waste and fill material as
pollutants, and one is not given a lesser permit requirement than
the other because it weighs more.
The weight of a pollutant may not be enough of a distinction to
prevent the Court from holding, in a future case, that its narrowed
definition of "navigable waters" applies also to the § 402 permit
program. However, the problem is a little less severe under the
Kennedy analysis, given that one could show a "significant nexus"
by proving that a pollutant travels downstream. Both the plurality
and Justice Kennedy relied heavily on SWANCC to justify their
narrowed definitions. However, SWANCC was not a case about
wetlands or tributaries. SWANCC involved an isolated pond in the
210. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2227 (2006).
211. Id.
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middle of a gravel pit wholly in the state of Illinois that was used
as a breeding ground for migratory birds.2" 2  Moreover,
SWANCC's holding was very specific: "[w]e hold that [the
regulation], as clarified and applied to petitioner's balefill site
pursuant to the 'Migratory Bird Rule,'... exceeds the authority
granted to respondents under § 404(a) of the CWA., 2 13 From this
narrow and incredibly specific holding, both the plurality and
Justice Kennedy extrapolated a rule applying to all non-navigable
tributaries and adjacent wetlands. Therefore, further extrapolating
Rapanos to cover the § 402 program is almost certain in future
litigation.
C. Outcomes and Options
1. The Likely Result on Remand for Rapanos and Carabell
Depending upon the framework adopted by the Sixth Circuit
(on remand) and other lower courts, John Rapanos and the
Carabells would face different results. 214 Under the plurality's
approach, the Corps could require a § 404 permit only if there was
a continuous surface connection between Rapanos' non-navigable
wetlands and the Kawkawlin River or Lake Huron. However,
under Justice Kennedy's "narrower" approach, the Corps could
assert jurisdiction, even without a continuous surface connection,
only if filling Rapanos' wetlands would substantially
hydrologically affect the Kawkawlin River or Lake Huron. The
question then becomes one of how such an effect could be
conclusively shown. Justice Kennedy's approach requires that the
effect be shown rather than only assumed. He does not, however,
discuss how such an effect may be proven. It may be that showing
a probability of pollution through environmental modeling would
212. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
213. Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
214. At the time of publication, the Sixth Circuit had not yet issued a
directive opinion in Rapanos' case. However, in 2007, the Sixth Circuit
remanded Carabell v. US. Army Corp of Engrs., 217 F. App'x 431 (6th Cir.
2007), to the district court with further instructions to remand to the Army Corps
of Engineers for further proceedings.
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be sufficient; however, further litigation would be necessary to
carve out what would and would not serve as adequate proof.
For the Carabells, the result under the plurality's approach
would be the opposite. The wetlands at issue in Carabell were
separated from the nearest navigable waterway or tributary thereof
by a man-made berm. Under the plurality's approach, the wetlands
would not be subject to the Corps' jurisdiction because they do not
share a surface water connection to the Auvase Creek or a tributary
thereof. However, under Justice Kennedy's approach, if it could
be conclusively shown that filling the wetlands had a substantial
effect on the creek or on Lake Huron, the Corps could require a
permit, even absent a surface water connection.
In both instances, if lower courts adopt the Kennedy test, even
though it is technically "narrower," it seems that more wetlands
would be covered. It would be almost impossible to find a
situation in which filling a wetland adjacent to a navigable
waterway would not substantially affect the navigable waterway.
The fact that more waters would be covered is important when
considering that the Carabell wetlands were separated from the
navigable creek by a man-made berm. Presumably, a developer
could construct a man-made barrier, like a berm, and thus avoid (or
deliberately fail) the plurality's surface water adjacency
requirement.
For practical purposes, EPA officers could not take an
aggregate sample of the Kawkawlin River or Lake Huron and
conclusively determine if additional sediment came directly from
Rapanos' wetland-filling. Even if it could be done with any
amount of scientific accuracy, such a measurement could only be
taken after the fact--that is, after Rapanos has filled the wetlands
and developed his shopping center. Even though environmental
scientists use modeling to suggest pollution effects, modeling is a
time consuming, expensive process that requires before-the-fact
data collection.
In most cases, it seems unnecessary to show, on a case-by-case
basis (such as the one Justice Kennedy advocates) that filling a
non-navigable wetland would significantly affect the adjacent
navigable water quality. One environmental scientist notes that
"[i]t is fair to say that changes in hydrology caused by urbanization
can exert complete control over a wetland's existence and
2008] NOTES 1019
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characteristics." 2 15  If wetland hydrology is inextricably tied to
urban development and the wetlands in question are adjacent to a
navigable body of water or tributary thereof, it logically follows
that substantially altering the wetland's hydrology necessarily
causes an effect on the navigable waterway. This reasoning
implies that there are no situations in which a wetland would be
under the Corps' jurisdiction according to the plurality's test (for
surface water adjacency) and fail the Kennedy ecological effects
test.
Even within a framework of adopting the narrowest available
holding, Justice Stevens' dissent was careful to note that in the
"unlikely event" that the plurality's test for jurisdiction was met,
but not Justice Kennedy's, lower courts should still uphold
jurisdiction.2 16 Given that the dissent would have agreed to uphold
jurisdiction in both cases based solely on an ecological effects
analysis, agreeing with the plurality would command an eight
member majority.
2. Available Options
After Rapanos, a few options are available to correct the
ambiguity. In 2003, in response to SWANCC, the EPA and the
Army Corps of Engineers initiated an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to request public input on the meaning of "waters of
the United States."217 The notice recognized the value of wetlands,
including flood risk reduction, water quality improvement, fish and
wildlife habitat, and maintenance of the hydrologic integrity of
aquatic ecosystems.218 After receiving over 130,000 comments,
the Bush Administration, EPA, and Corps "reiterated the
215. Id. See also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Wetlands, Oceans &
Watersheds, America's Wetlands: Our Vital Link Between Land and Water,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/vital/wetlands.pdf (last visited Feb. 5,
2008). Wetlands have important filtering capabilities for intercepting runoff.
As runoff water passes through, wetlands retain excess nutrients and pollutants
and reduce sediment that would clog waterways and affect fish and amphibian
egg development. Id.
216. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act
Regulatory Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1,991 (Jan.
15, 2003).
218. Id. at 1994.
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Administration's commitment to the goal of 'no net loss' of
wetlands" by not issuing a new rule, thereby "preserving the
federal government's authority to protect our wetlands."
219
Three years later in Rapanos, Chief Justice Roberts filed a
separate concurrence to discuss the failed 2003 notice, which, in
his view, "went nowhere." 220  He noted that the situation in
Rapanos could have been avoided by proceeding with the notice,
in which the Corps could have "plenty of room to operate in
developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their
authority.",22 1 Presumably his concurrence indicates that new
regulations, if they more clearly defined the scope of "the waters of
the United States," would be entitled to Supreme Court deference
in future litigation. Given the failure of the recent notice, it is
unlikely that another would command a different result. It is
possible that the Corps and the EPA decided not to continue with
the 2003 rulemaking under the belief that SWANCC's holding was
narrowly limited to applications of the "Migratory Bird Rule." If
so, then both agencies may reconsider a rule in light of the Court's
extrapolation of SWANCC into the totality of the § 404 program.
Such a rule could create regulations to accommodate the Kennedy
significant nexus test---setting up a presumption of a significant
nexus when one fills or discharges in a non-navigable waterway
adjacent to other covered waters. This presumption would then
shift the burden to would-be polluters in order to show that the
activity would not significantly affect the navigable waterway.
This option eliminates some of the problems associated with
Rapanos, such as costly and difficult enforcement.
Absent changes to the regulatory framework, Congress could
step in to amend the Clean Water Act's definition of "navigable
waters." The plurality noted that the underlying statute had not
undergone any changes during the five past presidential
219. Press Release, EPA and Army Corps Issue Wetlands Decision (Dec. 16,
2003); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Wetlands, Oceans and Watersheds,
Background Information: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the
Clean Water Act definition of "Waters of the United States", http://www.
epa.gov/owow/wetlands/guidance/SWANCC/anprm-bg.html (last visited Feb. 5,
2008).
220. 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
221. Id.
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administrations. 222  Maybe successive Congresses since the
CWA's passage in 1972 felt no need to make modifications in light
of the efficiency of expanding Corps regulations. However, since
SWANCC and Rapanos, one Senator has prompted Congress to
enter the fray with Senate Bill 912--the Clean Water Authority
Restoration Act of 2005.223 Sponsored by Senator Russell
Feingold, the legislation attempts to redefine "waters of the United
States." 224 The legislation restates the purpose of the CWA (to
restore integrity of the Nation's waters).2 5 It also notes that "small
and periodically-flowing streams comprise the majority of all
stream channels... and serve critical biological and hydrological
functions that affect entire watersheds, including reducing the
introduction of pollutants to large streams and rivers."22 6  The
legislation would strike each incidence of "navigable waters" from
the CWA and insert "waters of the United States" 227 (thereby
eliminating that pesky "the" problem that Justice Scalia referred to
in the plurality).228  "Waters of the United States" would be
defined as:
all waters subject to the ebb and flow of .the tide, the
territorial seas, and all interstate and intrastate waters and
their tributaries, including lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes,
natural ponds, and all impoundments of the foregoing, to
the fullest extent that these waters, or activities affecting
these waters, are subject to the legislative power of
Congress under the Constitution.
229
222. Id. at 2215 (plurality opinion).
223. A Bill to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to clarify the
jurisdiction of the United States over waters of the United States, S. 912, 109th
Cong. (2005).
224. Id. § 2(2).
225. Id. § 2(1).
226. Id. § 3(5), (7).
227. S. 912 § 5(3).
228. See supra Part III.C. 1.
229. Id. § 4(3)(23). The author recognizes that the legislation may implicate
the reach of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. SWANCC,
Riverside Bayview Homes, and Rapanos each addressed without deciding
possible Commerce Clause implications. Such concerns are beyond the scope of
this note. Justice Scalia noted in the opinion of the plurality that a broader
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Senate Bill 912 was referred to the U.S. Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works in August 2006 and is currently
awaiting debate.
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V. CONCLUSION
The famed hero of the eighties B-movie set, Swamp Thing
arose from the murky depths of a marsh after a scientist's failed
attempt to create an ambiguous half-plant/half-animal that could
survive in the harshest conditions. Two decades later, something
ambiguous has again arisen from the same murky depths--the
Rapanos decision. With Rapanos, the Court set out to clarify the
scope of the Army Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction over
"navigable waters" in the § 404 fill permit program. What
happened, however, was the opposite. The law seems more
confused now than it was after SWANCC. Lower courts now have
an ambiguous standard to determine whether or not a developer
needs to apply for a fill permit.
Both the plurality and Justice Kennedy have chosen an under-
inclusive view of the scope of federal jurisdiction of non-navigable
wetlands. This approach is administratively and economically
impracticable. Developers like Rapanos, who choose to gamble by
not getting a permit, are now in a position to place a difficult
scientific and economic burden on the Corps.
Even with the previous "over-inclusive" permitting system in
place, the Nation has far to go to achieving the Clean Water Act's
objective of restoring the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters. Under-inclusive regulation does
nothing to improve the methods to achieve that goal.
definition of "the waters of the United States" besides the one that the plurality
recommended would raise serious federalism concerns. Rapanos v. United
States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2260-61 (2006).
230. At the time of publication, lawmakers had reintroduced the legislation,
which failed to make it past the 109th Congress. Reintroduced by Senator
Feingold (and joined by nineteen others), the Clean Water Restoration Act of
2007 adopts the same definition of "waters of the United States" as proffered in
the 2005 Act. The 2007 Act has been referred to the Committee on
Environment and Public Works. See Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007, S.
1870, 110th Cong. (2007).
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The Court left open two possibilities. The first possibility is
that its extrapolation of SWANCC into the whole of the § 404
permitting program opens the door towards exporting a narrow
definition of "navigable waters" to other portions of the CWA. For
many environmentalists, this possibility is not pleasant. The
second possibility is that the Court would extend deference to
revised Corps regulations in future litigation. Revised regulations
could bring the majority of non-navigable wetlands and tributaries
back under the Corps' control. In the alternative, Congressional
amendment to the CWA could restore the intent of Congress to
regulate the health of overall water quality. Water flows in
hydrologic cycles and it is therefore necessary to control water
pollution entering the waterways, rather than to mitigate the
harmful effects of water pollution afterwards.
Brandee Ketchum*
* This article is dedicated to my mother; trees were her favorite part of the
natural landscape. I would like to thank Professor Kenneth Murchison for his
assistance and advice in preparing this article.
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